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The political and ethical challenge of multi-drug
resistant tuberculosis
Chris Degeling, Chris Mayes, Wendy Lipworth, Ian Kerridge, Ross Upshur (2015)

ABSTRACT
This article critically examines current responses to multi-drug resistant tuberculosis
and argues that bioethics needs to be willing to engage in a more radical critique of
the problem than is currently offered. In particular, we need to focus not simply on
market-driven models of innovation and anti-microbial solutions to emergent and
re-emergent infections such as TB. The global community also needs to address
poverty and the structural factors that entrench inequalities—thus moving beyond
the orthodox medical/public health frame of reference.

The problem of drug-resistant tuberculosis
Twenty years after tuberculosis (TB) was declared a global public health emergency,
it remains a leading infectious cause of death worldwide. TB also remains primarily a
disease of poverty; higher rates of incidence follow in lock step with social and
economic disadvantage. Two billion people are known to be infected with
Mycobacterium tuberculosis. In its most recent report, The World Health
Organization (2012) estimated that 8.6 million people develop TB each year and 1.3
million people die from active infection – the vast majority amongst the poor and
marginalized in low- and middle-income countries.
Data from surveillance programs and drug resistance surveys suggests that almost 4
percent of newly diagnosed cases and 20 percent of re-activated infections are
caused by multi-drug resistant strains [MDR-TB] of the bacterium. About 630,000
(roughly 10 percent) of these MDR-TB cases exhibit extensive drug resistance [XDRTB], which means that at least one of the two most potent first-line TB medications
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and at least one of the three injectable second-line medications are no longer
effective (Center for Disease Control 2013). Currently, less than half of identified
MDR-TB patients are successfully treated – reflecting high mortality rates and
discontinuation of treatment (World Health Organization 2012).
It has been recognized since the 1950s that TB requires a combination of therapeutic
agents because of the bacterium’s capacity to develop resistance. Drug resistant
cases often require more than twenty months of access to second-line drugs (that
can have serious side effects - especially when given to people who are also HIV
positive). It is also known that the successful administration of these agents requires
relative social, economic and political stability. The effects of inadequate sociopolitical infrastructure and irrational prescribing, particularly the use of single
agents, combine to present significant barriers to patients receiving and adhering to
effective treatment, which can further foster resistance to therapeutic agents. MDRTB also has deleterious impacts on existing programs and structural resources. For
example in South Africa the incidence of resistant strains is less than 3% of all TB
cases. Yet efforts to treat these people consume about 35% of the budget allocated
for TB control threatening the viability of established national programs (Pooran et
al. 2013). Moreover the global emergence of socially dis-advantaged populations
with XDR-TB who receive no institutional support and are consequently at large in
their communities, indicates that XDR-TB is not only a significant risk to global health
but an increasingly acute ethical and medico-legal challenge (Denholm et al. 2014;
Selgelid 2008; Hughes, Cox, and Ford 2012).

The innovation gap and the logic of market incentives
Medications currently used in first-line treatment regimens for TB are more than
fifty years old. While drug resistance has always been a concern (Daniels and Hill
1952; Fleming 1945), TB has become increasingly drug resistant during this time, and
it is now broadly accepted that the effective treatment of TB requires the
development of new pharmaceutical agents that allow for shorter, simpler and more
tolerable treatment regimens that can be used across a range of different contexts
and settings (Stop TB Partnership 2006). Since the 1990s global efforts to overcome
social and structural barriers to effective TB control have focused on the directly
observed treatment short-course or DOTS strategy (World Health Organization
2006). However, it is now becoming clear that the reification of this simple
standardised approach to TB diagnosis and treatment has harmed the development
of locally appropriate programs. Indeed in some ways, DOTS has been in tension
with, and, thereby, a hindrance to, on-the-ground efforts to deal with MDR-TB
emergence (Keshavjee and Farmer 2012; Harper 2010). Experiences with
implementing DOTS and our extensive knowledge of the biosocial and structural
drivers of incidence and resistance tell us that a multilayered approach is necessary.
Even as TB remains a disease of social disadvantage and deprivation, developing an
effective armamentarium remains a pre-condition of sustainable progress in the
fight against MDR-TB, especially in resource-poor and endemic settings (Zumla et al.
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2014; Dheda et al. 2014).
Yet despite the desperate need for new TB medicines and new ways of avoiding
resistance, the TB drug pipeline is still considered to be fragile and thin (Ma et al.
2010; Grosset, Singer, and Bishai 2012). While spending on pharmaceuticals has
been the fastest growing segment of healthcare budgets in most countries for
decades (Danzon and Nicholson 2012), most large pharmaceutical companies have
now left the antibiotic discovery field altogether in favour of developing drugs for
more lucrative chronic diseases. In this regard, it is sobering to realize that only
sixteen drugs were developed between 1975 and 1999 for infectious diseases
endemic in the world’s poorest countries, including TB, malaria, Chagas Disease and
others (Trouiller et al. 2002).
Even where they do exist, drug development and regulatory processes for TB are
slow. For example, one new agent, Bedaquiline was first reported in Nature in 2005
but only approved by the FDA in December 2012. Many new drugs are repurposed
raising questions about their increased susceptibility to resistance, and completely
novel agents have limited safety data. There is also a translation gap between clinical
trial efficacy and program effectiveness and evidence of “real world” safety. Indeed,
it is arguable that rolling out medicines that may have significant adverse effects
such as bedaquiline in the absence of adequate pharmacovigilance is a form of global
malpractice. Compounding this, patent issues make the necessary combination
studies difficult, further delaying whatever “real world” impact a new drug may have
by years (Wallis 2013). And because research efforts are inevitably tied to
pharmaceutical markets, the resulting culture of competition between industries,
researchers, and institutions results in duplication of effort and data hoarding (So et
al. 2012).
There are two possible reasons to explain the limited development of new
pharmacotherapies to treat tuberculosis: the science is too hard and/or there is a
lack of commercial incentive for innovation—i.e. there is a clear failure of the market
to address a public good (Breitstein and Spigelman 2013; Iseman 2007; Pogge 2007,
2005; Theuretzbacher 2012). There is evidence to support both of these
possibilities. With respect to the science, the widespread adoption of genomic-based
methods of target discovery for new antimicrobial agents has had limited success
(Boucher et al. 2009; Livermore et al. 2011). And with respect to the way in which
markets fail to attend to clear public needs, the potential market for new TB drugs is
not attractive enough commercially to stimulate a corporate appetite for the risks of
funding research and development. Given the enormous global burden of disease,
market size is clearly not the issue. Rather, the limiting factor is the relatively low
price that the market can sustain. In this regard it is noteworthy that WHO
recommends that TB drugs should be provided free of charge (World Health
Organization 2006 9). The root cause of the inattention of markets to TB-related
pharmacological research has been attributed both to poverty (insufficiently
developed economies and mostly poor patients), and to intellectual property
restrictions (patents), international trade agreements (e.g. TRIPS), and to systems of
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research and research governance (Trouiller et al. 2002; Piddock 2012; Gathii 2005;
Sonderholm 2010). Whatever the respective merits of these opposing arguments,
the effect is the same.
Attempts to boost innovation
Proposed solutions to the lack of market incentive to address global unmet needs
have come from within and outside the pharmaceutical industry and include both
‘push’ and ‘pull’ mechanisms that either seek to decouple the cost of research from
the need for shareholder profit, or reinforce existing intellectual property
protections. Push mechanisms generally support research by reducing the costs and
risks of research and development through global funds, government grants, public /
private partnerships and philanthropy. Other mechanisms include tax breaks for
companies that undertake research on TB, or selectively fast-tracking regulatory
approval by abridging or even scrapping regulatory requirements for demonstrating
safety and efficacy (Piddock 2012).
Pull mechanisms support research by guaranteeing the viability of a market for a
new drug through pre-purchase agreements (which effectively subsidise access for
disadvantaged populations), patent extensions or ‘wild-card’ patent trades whereby
the company is rewarded for developing a new treatment by getting to keep a
patent on another product [i.e. a blockbuster drug] of their choosing for longer than
would otherwise be permitted (Ravvin 2008). Other pull measures suggested
include Pogge’s (2012)model of graded compensation from a Health Impact Fund,
with the amount of money awarded being based on analysis of the reduction of the
global burden of the disease attributable to the new products. This model has three
components: (i) any effective drugs developed to treat neglected diseases are to be
free of IP restrictions, diminishing price exclusion and access problems; (ii) the
developers are then rewarded from a health fund, in proportion to the impact of the
new agent on the global burden of disease – thereby generating and incentive for
innovation and effective administration; and, (iii) the fund is supported by developed
nations – based on prudential concerns such as lower prices on all essential
medications in all markets, the economic value of biomedical research, and
increasing global capacity to respond to health emergencies.
Consistent with the history of pharmaceutical development push mechanisms have
been the most subscribed, although pharmaceutical companies reportedly remain
open to – or, less generously, are holding out for – highly commercially favourable
pull mechanisms such as patent trade arrangements (Outterson, Samora, and KellerCuda 2007). Public-private partnerships such as the Global TB Alliance, the Critical
Path to TB Drug Regimens Initiative and The Gates Foundation-funded TB Drug
Accelerator have had some success in bringing new drugs/agents to market (Zumla
et al. 2014). The TB Alliance funded the development of Bedaquiline, which was
approved by the FDA in December 2012 (the first novel drug since Rifampacin 1967).
Delamanid was approved by the European Medicines Agency in November 2013 –
notably, both of these drugs were approved after only Phase 2b trials. The Global TB
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Alliance is currently testing a 4-drug regimen for sensitive TB to reduce treatment
periods from 6 to 4 months and testing bedaquiline in multi-agent combinations
(Wraight 2012). Ten other drugs are in late stage clinical trials (although 6 of these
are repurposed). There are also 10 candidate vaccines and 2 immunotherapeutic
agents in late clinical trials (Abubakar et al. 2013).
However, while there clearly has been some success, both industry insiders and
external analysts agree that current approaches to incentivising drug development
are not sufficiently enticing to the pharmaceutical industry (Hamad 2010; Osborne
2013). The numbers support the view that industry commitment is patchy at best.
Total research funding for TB has fallen between 2010 and 2013 from US$660 to US
$620 million (Burki 2014), and pharmaceutical companies have reduced their input
by 22 percent, such that the private sector now contributes less than 20 percent of
total R +D funding. Much of the cost of development is already borne by the public –
through funding basic science in universities and charitable research foundations
(Garattini and Chalmers 2009). In addition, both push and pull mechanisms have
met with prudential concerns, equity questions and competing consequentialist and
libertarian objections, based on the erosion of established safety mechanisms and
their potential to distort existing drug development pathways and pharmaceutical
markets to produce perverse outcomes (Sonderholm 2010; Peterson, Hollis, and
Pogge 2010). It seems, therefore, that existing approaches to overcoming market
disinterest have had limited success and that we need new ways of conceptualising
the problem of drug resistant TB.
Reformulating the problem
Leading experts point to recent progress in developing new agents, but agree that
further effort is needed (Dheda et al. 2014; Zumla et al. 2014; Abubakar et al. 2013).
We believe that this is where bioethics comes in, because it can offer important
perspectives that are not tied to a particular solution and help us to keep what is
ethically important in focus—promoting global equity by reducing poverty,
optimising public health and preventing the spread of disease. Bioethics, as we
understand it, is a field of critical inquiry characterised by methodological pluralism
and capacity to identify and apply normative theories appropriate to the content and
context of morally complex techno-social and socio-political issues (Dawson 2010;
Bishop and Jotterand 2006). In Catherine Mills’s (2010 145) terms, a bioethics
grounded in the “lived-realities and ethical practice everyday life” can remind us that
MDR and XDR-TB are primarily products of human agency – ‘we have taken the
curable and made it nearly incurable’ – and that we are collectively responsible for
finding a solution (Pogge 2005; Farmer and Gastneau Campos 2004; Upshur, Singh,
and Ford 2009). More specifically, a critical bioethics can alert us to the possibility of
more radical solutions to market disinterest, while at the same time helping us to
balance the innovation imperative against the need to:
 address structural issues, such as lack of universal health coverage,
employment and education—measures that are arguably more effective than
any new drug;
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ensure that innovative drugs are regulated, reimbursed and administered in
such a way that safety and efficacy are assured, and resistance to new agents
does not develop (thereby further entrenching health inequities); and
ensure that the needs of those currently infected with TB are not overlooked
in the pursuit of longer term market and structural reforms.

Rebooting innovation
Existing approaches to enhancing innovation all start from assumptions that
innovation must be market- rather than needs-driven (Williams 2012) and therefore
all centre on either uncoupling the development of new pharmaceuticals and
income from selling them (push mechanisms), or instituting measure that entrench
profitable monopolies for private interests (pull mechanisms).
In this paper, we argue that what is needed is not simply pushes and pulls, but rather
a radical ‘rebooting’ of drug development pathways (Shlaes et al. 2013). One
alternative is to weaken the pharmaceutical industry’s privileged position as a
gatekeeper to innovation (which remains the case even in the context of the publicprivate partnerships described above) and instead find ways to attain broad
institutional support for Open Science projects. These are large-scale enterprises
that enable scientists and citizens to work through a free repository for biological
and molecular data – such as that created by Collaborative Drug Discovery funded by
NIH/BMGF, which has data on three hundred thousand compounds (Ekins and
Williams 2014). Citizen led research strategies have so far proved effective in
physics, astronomy, environmental sciences, and geology. This research could be
supported by cheap/free-ware Apps for data mining and predictive modelling and
publications devoted to TB could be free (Médecins Sans Frontières Access
Campaign 2012).
This is not a new idea, but its realisation has been impeded by existing TRIPS system.
As recently as 2012 Médecins Sans Frontières demanded, amongst other measures,
the pooling of intellectual property to promote TB research (2012). The World
Health Organization rejected the application in December 2013, even though it is
widely recognized that without access to a large library of compounds, then the
majority of both industry-led and Open Science-based innovation will inevitably
remain restricted to target-based research strategies (Osborne 2013; So et al. 2012).
Another way to reboot innovation would be to institute new forms of taxation. In
2011 Médecins Sans Frontières called for a financial transaction tax (FTT) to support
global health initiatives, such as funding TB diagnosis, treatment and drug
development. MSF’s call coincided with the proposal at the European Union for a
FTT to create a fund to bailout the banking sector in case of another global financial
crisis. The idea of the FTT, also known as the ‘Robin Hood Tax’, is to impose a small
tax (between 0.01% and 0.1%) on financial transactions between financial
institutions. MSF argued that the accumulated funds should be used to “bailout”
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global health. Although widely popular among EU citizens, only 11 member states
agreed to participant and the proposal is currently stalled.
The popularity of FTTs as measure to address global inequality is further reflected in
the unexpected celebration of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century. Piketty
argues that wealth inequality in the 21st century might reach or surpass the
oligarchic levels of the 19th century. Following earlier proposals from economists
such as James Tobin and Joseph Stiglitz, Piketty seeks to democratise wealth via
‘progressive global tax on capital’, he claims ‘[s]uch a tax would provide a way to
avoid an endless inegalitarian spiral and to control the worrisome dynamics of global
capital concentration’ (Piketty 2014 360). The implementation of this tax would
require unprecedented international cooperation, which Piketty is not optimistic
about. However, in acknowledging the utopian features of his proposal, Piketty
suggests it can be used as an aspirational ideal and reference point to measure
alternate proposals.
Bioethicists could draw on the current popularity of Piketty among publics and
politicians to call for a global tax that targets the pharmaceutical industry. The tax
would be hypothecated to attend to therapeutic and structural needs of MDR and
XDR-TB. A global tax on Pharma, whether the target is revenue or non-TB R&D,
would produce a sizeable fund that could be put towards development of MDR and
XDR-TB therapies as well as providing assistance and incentives to developing
countries for structural reform in education, infrastructure and healthcare.
Additional levies could be placed on tissue and biological specimen exportation and
a reputational tithe on researchers in high income nations who get tenure on data
derived from low income nations.
While the pharmaceutical industry might not embrace such a proposal, a number of
factors could see it gain some traction where the FTT did not. First, unlike the FTT,
the tax would be global and therefore would not affect competition. Pharmaceutical
companies could not remove themselves from one tax jurisdiction and move to a
more favourable one. Second, a global tax might limit the opportunities for
pharmaceutical companies to seek tax havens—something that has been
enormously frustrating to countries like the United States. Third, a global pharma
tax would be consistent with moves to reduce global wealth inequality and increase
social justice. In this regard it is noteworthy that citizens within the EU gave
significant support to the FTT, suggesting that a wider global population may also be
supportive of a tax scheme to address TB and global health inequalities.
Beyond innovation
In addition to prompting radical thinking about global markets in pharmaceuticals,
when bioethics is grounded in peoples’ lived realities it also reminds us that
biomedical innovation is only a partial solution to the problem of drug-resistant TB.
Upshur has argued that the emergence of XDR-TB is a rupture in the narrative of
biomedical progress that dominates medicine and bioethics (Upshur, Singh, and Ford
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2009). It is thus necessary to keep in mind the limits of positivistic scientific solutions
to social, political and economic problems and step beyond the bounded reasoning
of market mechanisms and individually oriented interventions. Therefore, whether
funds for TB are derived from a Piketty-like tax, the MSF’s FTT or crowd sourced, it is
important that they be used to develop new therapeutic agents, locally appropriate
mechanisms of implementation and address poverty and structural factors such as
lack of universal access to health care, education and housing. To do this, we may
consider incentivising innovation in other domains such as environmental
engineering, housing design and urban planning, with a focus on mitigating poverty
and preventing the spread of infection.
It is also important to bear in mind that market disinterest extends to the ways in
which medicines are paid for, and the ways in which they are prescribed. Everyone
accepts, in principle, that new agents and regimens for TB must be accessible and
affordable to those who need them, and administered appropriately to avoid
resistance. But support for programs that aim to achieve this are not priorities for
companies who simply want to get their products to market, and are also highly
dependent upon political and social climates.
At the same time, a balance must be found between the need to improve treatment
of patients who are currently infected with TB, and the need to research and
develop new agents, and control access to the most effective regimens so that
resistance does not develop (Kesselheim and Outterson 2010). This is a delicate
situation. For if we do not move beyond DOTS and fail to adequately attend to the
economic and structural conditions that enable effective administration of
therapeutic agents, it is likely that XDR-TB will develop a resistance to new therapies
and result in a situation in which pathogens have established resistance to all
available anti-microbials (Raviglione 2006). However, if new therapies are
developed, but we refuse to administer them until adequate infrastructure is
established, then we abandon those currently infected to suffering and death
(Farmer 2003 199).
Conclusion
If we are to address the problem of drug resistant TB, then we need to be willing to
engage in a more radical critique of the problem than is currently offered. In
particular, we need to focus not simply on market-driven models of innovation and
anti-microbial solutions to emergent and re-emergent infections such as TB. We also
need to address poverty and the structural factors that entrench inequalities—thus
moving beyond the orthodox medical/public health frame of reference. At the same
time, we need to ensure new medicines are safe, available to those who need them,
and administered in such a way that resistance does not develop, all while
considering the needs of existing patients. Bioethics can help in this complex
situation, but only if it radically rejects the notion that MDR-TB is ‘business as usual’.
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